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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASS'T. DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND ESTIMATION

Subject: Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates with the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments

1. It is the opinion of the Director that no effort should be made at this time to obtain revision of NSA Directive No. 1.
2. Discussion in committees of Congress has indicated concern there lest CIG disseminate intelligence estimates, the content or tenor of which is unknown to the IAB agencies. The Director has assured Congress that this does not happen.
3. It is therefore requested that further consideration be given to improvement in the operation of the present basic policy and that suggestions be submitted for revised procedures if such are considered to be needed.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DE/mhb
I-23 July 1947


CAPTAIN. USA
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

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16 July 1947

MEMORANDUM TO : The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates
with the Intelligence Divisions of the State,
War and Navy Departments

✓ REFERENCE (A) : Memorandum from Chief, ICAPS, to Acting Assistant
Director, ORE, dated 3 July 1947

REFERENCE (B) : CIG Administrative Order #32 ✓

REFERENCE (C) : NIA Directive #1


ENCLOSURE (A) : Suggested "Memorandum from the Director of
Central Intelligence to the Intelligence
Advisory Board"

1. Reference (A) requested that the Office of Reports and Estimates submit to the Director an outline of the situation confronting it in the matter of coordinating intelligence estimates with the departmental intelligence divisions prepared in proper form for his possible use at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. Reference (B) is a CIG Administrative Order touching on this subject.
3. Reference (C) is the basic NIA Directive relating to this subject.
4. Enclosure (A) is a suggested draft of memorandum for circulation to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
5. It is believed that the principal coordinative problem confronting the Office of Reports and Estimates and therefore confronting CIG as a whole relates to the matter of the coordinative procedures required before a Central Intelligence Estimate may be circulated. It

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is believed that the present procedures involved in preparing national intelligence requirements are, in general, satisfactory or at least we have not had sufficient experience with these procedures to determine at what points they should be changed. Enclosure (A), therefore, deals exclusively with the problem of correcting the coordinative procedures relating to the production of national intelligence and recommends an appropriate change to NIA Directive #1. If the recommended change to NIA Directive #1 is approved, this will of course entail an appropriate modification of CIG Administrative Order #32. Specific recommendation for the change of CIG Administrative Order #32 is not included in Enclosure (A) because it is considered that the change of a CIG Administrative Order is a matter for determination by the Director of Central Intelligence and not subject to action by members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.


Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

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Enclosure - 1

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

1. The cumulative experience of the past year with the existing procedure for coordinating Central Intelligence Estimates with the departments represented on the Intelligence Advisory Board has led to an increasing conviction that in the interests of more effective production and presentation of national intelligence, certain of these procedures should be modified. Furthermore, it is believed that these procedures can be so modified as to promote efficiency without in fact militating against thorough coordination of estimates with the intelligence divisions of the departments concerned, which is and must continue to be one of the fundamental considerations entering into the production of a Central Intelligence Estimate.

2. The standard procedure followed by Central Intelligence for inter-agency coordination of its estimates provides for continuous consultation between Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments throughout the preparation of these studies. (Other agencies are consulted as appropriate depending upon the subject matter of the report.) The successive steps of this process are:

a. Initially, the Central Intelligence Officers assigned to prepare a report call on the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments. At these meetings, the departmental representatives are informed of the project and are consulted in detail regarding its scope and coverage.

b. During the preparation of the report day to day consultation is maintained to the extent necessary to keep informed of departmental views.

c. Upon completion of a preliminary draft of the report, it is referred to the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments for comment, criticism, suggestion and possible amendment. The views of these experts are thoroughly considered and, at a series of conferences,

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revisions are worked out and usually agreement is reached on a revised draft acceptable to all concerned.

d. The draft report incorporating any revisions arrived at as a result of the procedures outlined in g above is then referred through official channels to the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments for formal concurrence through representatives of those departments specifically designated for this purpose by each of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board (see CIG Administrative Order #12 implementing NIA Directive #1, paragraph 6).

e. Formal comments on this revised draft report are received from the departmental intelligence divisions and are made the basis for further revising the revised report to produce a final draft of the report. Whenever there is a dissent or a divergence of point of view on the part of any one of the departmental intelligence divisions, the matter is discussed in detail between representatives of Central Intelligence and the dissenting departmental intelligence division. If these representatives are unable to resolve their differences, the statement of the dissenting departmental intelligence division, setting forth its views, is published as a part of the finished report.

3. Consideration of the coordinating procedure outlined in paragraph 2 above and actual operation of the procedure for almost a year bring out the following points:

a. From its inception to the completion of a revised draft (step g of paragraph 2), each Central Intelligence Estimate represents the cooperative effort of the appropriate expert officers of Central Intelligence and of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments.

b. In every case, at the conclusion of step g, agreement has been attained or it is apparent that there will be a dissenting opinion by some one of the departmental intelligence divisions. Furthermore, the general tenor of any dissenting opinion is known.

c. Actual experience has shown that despite the best efforts of the departmental intelligence divisions, the time required to

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complete steps d and e entail a minimum delay in publication of two weeks, and in those rare instances where a dissenting opinion is involved, the delay is much longer, in some instances as much as two months.

d. Experience has also shown that additional comments received as a result of accomplishing steps d and e have, in general, made no material contribution to the estimate. This result is, of course a natural consequence of the thorough consultation and exchange of views of the appropriate expert officers of Central Intelligence and the departmental intelligence divisions, which is an accomplished fact at the conclusion of step e.

4. One of the functions of Central Intelligence, if not the most important function, is that of coordinating the intelligence efforts of governmental intelligence agencies. In this instance, it is a matter of thoroughly coordinating the production of particular types of intelligence reports between the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments and Central Intelligence. The rigid and cumbersome techniques established to effect this coordination in fact place in the hands of any one of the intelligence divisions of the participating departments the power of determining when and to what extent coordination has been accomplished. Under the system this power is absolute and can be exercised at the sole and absolute discretion of any one agency irrespective of the desires or views of all of the others. Manifestly the situation is an absurdity in that the coordinator (Central Intelligence) cannot discharge its responsibilities except on the sufferance of each one of the very agencies it is required to coordinate. It is believed that this situation is fundamentally wrong, is pregnant with possibilities of friction and is capable of gravely impairing the production and presentation of national intelligence. In view of the fact that Central Intelligence is required to coordinate the production of national intelligence, it is believed that concomittant responsibility for this coordination must be vested in Central Intelligence. In this instance this involves:

a. Determination by Central Intelligence of when coordination has been sufficiently accomplished.

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b. Determination of coordination procedures by Central Intelligence.

In this connection it may be remarked that Central Intelligence is responsible to the National Intelligence Authority for the performance of its duties and not to the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments. In their discretion, of course, these intelligence divisions enjoy the privilege of bringing to the attention of the National Intelligence Authority any matters touching on the duty performance of Central Intelligence.

5. It is therefore recommended that the principle be accepted that:

a. Central Intelligence determine when and to what degree coordination is necessary in the production of national intelligence.

b. Coordination procedures be determined by Central Intelligence.

6. In order to place the foregoing principle into effect, it is recommended that:

a. NIA Directive #1, dated 8 February 1946, "Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group", be revised at paragraph 6 as follows:

"6. The Central Intelligence Group will utilize all available intelligence in producing strategic and national policy intelligence. ~~All intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group will note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency. Participating intelligence agencies may dissent from any intelligence report prepared by the Central Intelligence Group, and dissenting opinions so prepared will be made available to all holders of reports dissented from.~~"

(NOTE: The change to NIA Directive #1, as outlined above, will of course entail a suitable modification of CIG Administrative Order #32.)

7. As a matter for Central Intelligence determination, it is considered that the procedure for coordinating the production of national

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intelligence will include steps a to g, inclusive, of paragraph 2. In the case of dissenting opinions on the part of any of the departmental intelligence divisions, these dissents, if obtained in time, will be published with the Central Intelligence Estimate; or if received too late for such publication, will be published as soon as received and circulated to all the recipients of the estimates. Each Central Intelligence Estimate will contain an affirmative statement of agreement or disagreement on the part of each departmental intelligence division.